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Prison vs. Closed Ward
Their Philosophical Relationship*
By OTTo E.

GUTTENTAG,

M.D.**

THE RELATIONSHIP of the closed ward as a place of commitment
for an accused, on the one hand, and prison and hell on the other,
is an important topic of discussion. It epitomizes the difference
between veterinary or botanical medicine and humar medicinebetween the physician as veterinarian or tree surgeon and the physician as a physician for human beings. All three-closed ward,
prison, and hell-have close relation to modes of biological existence, namely, being sick, being a criminal, and being a sinner.
However, only the attribute of being sick is ascribed to all creatures-being a criminal or a sinner is reserved exclusively for
human beings.
Today we shall restrict our discussion to the problem of the
closed ward vs. prison. First of all, hell or purgatory, as a place of
commitment for the atonement of sin, i.e., of betraying one's own
convictions, of being a heel as it were, is-for better or for worseno longer looked upon by many as an institution outside the room
of our own hearts. Second, and most important however, recent
developments in the fields of psychology and psychopathology have
raised problems in the relationship of the closed ward and prison
which need clarification.
Let me elucidate. Enormous advances in these fields during
the past 50 years have demonstrated the impact of man's general
biological, i.e., impersonal and unconscious, characteristics upon
* The following two papers are part of a symposium held at a Grand Rounds
Conference on May 16, 1956, at the University of California School of Medicine,

San Francisco, arranged by the sub-department of Homeopathy and sponsored by
the Homeopathic Foundation of California. The other two participants were
Doctor Karl M. Bowman, Head of the Department of Psychiatry, who spoke on
"Psychiatric Testing of Mental Freedom" and Mr. Thomas C. ,Lynch, District Attorney of the City and County of San Francisco, who spoke on 'Forced to Decide."
** Associate professor of Homeopathy, University of California School of
Medicine.
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his conscious reasoning and acting. These advances have deeply
influenced our attitude toward the anti-social behavior of our fellow humans. An ever widening range of anti-social acts which
menace society has been found to be due to mental disorder and
an ever widening range of mental disorder has been found to be
the source of such anti-social acts. In jurisprudence, this attitude
culminated in the now famous 1954 Durham decision of the Court
of Appeals in the District of Columbia. This decision reads, in
part, as follows: "The rule we now hold . .. is simply that an
accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the
product of mental disease or mental defect."1
Here, it seems, the issue becomes clouded, for the general biological characteristics-mental disease and mental defect-are obviously inadequate concepts to determine criminal responsibility.
Their acceptance as basic standards of reference for such determination does not offer any protection against criminal trials for
animals, and I believe everyone agrees that healthy animals never
commit crimes although they may commit anti-social acts. Jurisprudence is not a branch of biology.
We may gain an insight into the problem with which we are
dealing here if we recall that it might be you and I who are relegated to either prison or closed ward, and it may be you and I
who make the decision to commit someone to one or the other.
From the standpoint of the criminal act as an anti-social act, it
makes no difference to which of the two institutions we go or to
which of the two institutions we send the accused. Both the closed
ward and prison protect society equally well. Establishment of
two types of places of containment appears to be a needless
duplication.
But what about the jurisprudence which realizes that the accused is a human being and that the jurors are human beings, in
other words, creatures who are aware of their I-ness, yet prone to
the frailty of all flesh as you and I are. Such jurisprudence is
characterized by two facts.
First: Even though it is insistent upon its rights in general,
such jurisprudence restrains itself threefold, namely, in relation to
what is called "insanity," in relation to children, and of course, in
relation to animals. The question arises, therefore, as to what do
I Durham v. U.S., 1,214 F.2d 862, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1954).

MENTAL RESPONSIBILITY

children and the so-called insane, have in common with animals
in relation to law? The answer is that we do not attribute to these
three biological groups a range of reflection: of looking at one's
self, of responsibility and judicability, of answering and judging
one's self what one has made of one's self, 2 of conscience, of knowing with one's self, in other words, that experience of independence, the "mental freedom" which we attribute to ourselves as
"sane" adult humans.

Secondly, such jurisprudence is aware that although no one
can say where the final limits of human power lie3 and, intent as
we are on giving meaning to our lives, the darkness of fate is
impenetrable and every meaning we give to our lives and very
existence lacks an ultimate necessity. Our freedom is finite.4
It is at this juncture that the difference between the human
anti-social act which menaces society committed by the so-called
insane and children, and the anti-social act due to criminal intent
becomes apparent. The anti-social act of the insane or child results from absence or lack of development of mental freedom.
Consequently, the transgressor becomes the object of concern of
his fellow man. The anti-social act of the criminal results from
the full possession of his "finite freedom." The criminal disagrees
with a particular answer which his fellow humans have given to
some problem of interhuman relationship. In consequence, the
transgression becomes a primary object of concern of his fellow
man.
Does the separation of closed ward and prison exemplify this
difference? Indeed it does! Confinement in a closed ward is indefinite and not previously determined by law; for the length of
treatment required to restore mental freedom in a given individual cannot be predetermined. Incarceration in a prison is
definite and can be previously determined by law; for the act of
transgression itself is a definite event, and can be expressed in
terms of length and strength of enforced isolation, even if the act
never becomes a reality. In the closed ward, the patient remains
a fellow creature and in him, man's potentialities are respected,
2Tillich, Paul, The Courage To Be, New Vaven, Yale University Press, 1952,

p.51.3 Tillich, Paul, Love, Power, and Justice, Ontological Analyses And Ethical
Applications,New York and London, Oxford University Press, 1954, p. 78.
4 Ibid., p. 52.
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but he is adjudged sick. In prison, the prisoner remains a fellow
man, and in him man's freedom is respected, but his fellow humans disagree with a particular act of his. The prisoner does not
cease to be my alter ego, even though magis amicus lex.
In general then, both the prison and the closed ward are necessary. It is as brutal to put a healthy man into a closed ward, as it
is brutal to put a sick man into a prison-the healthy man in full
possession of his "finite freedom," and the sick man in limited
possession of it.
In principle, every legally accused person deserves as much
psychiatric as legal evaluation. A scale of compulsory psychiatric
treatment is desirable similar to that of the scale of legal restriction of physical freedom.
In the overwhelming majority of anti-social acts, the single act
will be a mixture of the accused person's limitations of freedom
due to sickness as well as to his opposing answer to the problem
of leading a meaningful life. The alternative is new with each
accused. Fiat justitia.

